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LAWYERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE COURT:
AFTERWORD
IRWIN BROWN*

"No, no!" said the Queen
"Sentence first - verdict afterwards."'
The process by which people are involuntarily committed to mental
institutions has been the subject of increased attention by both lawyers
and doctors.' And rightfully so, for no other area of the law permits,
as does civil commitment, the summary detention of persons for an
indefinite period of time.
"Due process" is satisfied by notifying the detainee-patient that
he may subsequently receive a judicial hearing if he requests one.3
The study of interaction between lawyers and psychiatrists in such
judicial hearings was part of a comprehensive study of the effect of
New York's Mental Hygiene Law, and is the subject of the article
4
reviewed here.
*

Executive Assistant to the President of the Baltimore City Council. B.A.,

1960, Roosevelt University; J.D., 1967, Loyola University, Chicago; Reginald Heber
Smith Community Law Fellow, 1967-68.
. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 161 (ann. ed. 1960).
2. The following cases are among the most recent challenging state civil commitment laws: United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.
1969); Logan v. Arafeb, Civil No. 14386 (D. Conn., filed May, 1971); Dixon v.
Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Anderson v. Solomon, 315 F.
Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615 (1972).
On civil rights and civil commitment, see generally J.KATZ, J.GOLDSTEIN &
A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY & LAW (1967); R. RocK, et al.,
HOSPITALIZATION & DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968); Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969 & 1970)
Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101 (1971).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 13 (1972). For categorical listings of statutes from
other states see S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED & THE LAW (rev.
ed. 1971).
4. The complete work is Kumasaka, Gupta, Stokes & Sharma, Final Report:
Evaluation of Mentally Ill - Civil Commitment Problems, May, 1971 (unpublished
report under National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 16485).
Besides the article discussed herein, other portions of the study have been

published: Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in
Due Process, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 405 (1971); Zitrin, Herman, & Kumasaka, New
York's Mental Hygiene Law - A Preliminary Evaluation, 54 MENTAL HYGIENE 28
(1970); Kumasaka, Stokes & Gupta, Criteria of Involuntary Hospitalization, 26
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 399 (1972).
Several others have been accepted
for publication: Kumasaka, Lawyer's Role in Involuntary Commitment New
York's Experiment, MENTAL HYGIENE; Kumasaka & Stokes, Involuntary Hospitaliza-
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I.

METHODOLOGY

IN

COURT

Before reaching the findings and conclusions of the authors, it
might be useful to explore the methodology employed in this study,
not only to examine its validity, but more importantly, to shed light
on the difficulties of achieving an analytically objective approach to
the subject matter. While the complete case files (hearing transcript,
physician certificates, and MHIS report) were examined, it is clear
that the attitudinal approaches of the doctors and lawyers involved
was determined by the professional analysts primarily from the form
and content of the questions asked during the hearings and the responses given. The problem in this approach is alluded to by the
authors in their examination of part of the testimony in Case 27.'
There, as in most of the cases examined, the analysts disagreed
whether the doctor and lawyer were in agreement on the issue involved (in this case, "dangerousness"). The explanation of the disagreement by the authors is certainly plausible, if not necessarily
correct. But is it not also plausible that the lawyer conducting the
cross-examination in the case seriously doubted that dangerousness
existed? It is not clear whether any further cross-examination was
conducted which would have given any additional clues. But if we assume that the cross-examination ended with the transcript excerpt, can
we not also assume that the lawyer prudently ended the examination
after planting the seed of doubt regarding the patient's dangerousness?
That the lawyer-analyst concluded (or "guessed") otherwise not
only suggests problems in this approach, but also raises questions as
to whether an analyst could be objective in a study of this sort. We
are furnished with the identity and credentials of the analysts involved, who appear to be eminently well qualified as experts in the
tion: Attitudes and

Opinions of

Lawyers and Psychiatrists,

COMPREHENSIVE

PSYCHIATRY.

A number of interesting conclusions are reached in the Preliminary Evaluation, supra, and should be noted, notwithstanding the risks involved in a major oversimplification. Most patients were released administratively by the doctors prior to
the actual hearing. At each step of the process leading to judicial hearing, clinical
variables become less important factors in considering the patient for release. At the
hearing level, personal expressions of the patient and his socio-demographic characteristics are of paramount importance. Patients who request hearings stand a much
better chance of being released sooner than others, and the chance for release increases
further with the pressure exerted by the patient. This results in the detention of
"less sick" patients who do not actively voice their opposition to commitment and
release of the "sicker" vocal patients.
The number of patients administratively released has increased significantly
since the formation of the Mental Health Information Service.
5.

See pp. 14-15 supra.
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field. But this is not enough. The analysts' conceptions of "dangerousness," "functioning," "abnormal behavior," and so forth, as well as
their views on involuntary civil commitment must have been the yardstick they employed to identify the issues in the cases examined. That
experts do not agree is clear,' and we are not furnished with the
7
analysts' views or conceptions.
Furthermore, if, as the authors suggest, it is not clear whether
the differences between the lawyers and the psychiatrists are due to
the nature of the court procedure or to their preconceived opinions
regarding the need for civil commitment, we are faced with the situation in which the attitudes and conceptions of doctors and lawyers
which may be based on unknown preconceived opinions are being
measured by another doctor and lawyer who have their own preconceived opinions which are similarly unknown to the readers."
Despite the flawed methodology, one must generally agree with
the conclusions reached for several reasons. Solid evidence leading
directly to certain conclusions is simply not available in this type of
study and a relatively high level of objectivity is not attainable. Also
one is forced to conclude, from a reading of the transcript excerpts
and the analysts' evaluations, that a communication problem does, in
fact, exist. Finally, these conclusions accord with those reached by
most practitioners who have, at one time or another, examined a
psychiatrist on the witness stand. It remains to be seen whether the
communications problem is merely attitudinal in nature or is a reflection of other factors.
II.

THE

AUTHORS'

CONCLUSIONS

Concluding that lawyers and doctors would not be in complete
agreement even if they understood each other, the authors seek to
isolate and examine points of disagreement to determine if its nature
is more apparent than real. This examination is important, they
contend, for the patient is the one who is ultimately burned by the
heat. In fact, a number of definitional differences are revealed, and
a clearer understanding of What was meant in the doctor-lawyer
6. Compare, e.g., 1969 Hearings, supra, note 2, at 304 (remarks of Dr. H.
Kaufman), with 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 12 (remarks of Dr. Z. Lebensohn).
7. The views of the author of this Afterword are less relevant but, anticipating
like criticisms from the reader, the writer would state that he finds the arguments
advanced by Dr. Thomas Szasz most convincing.
8. A gnawing question remains: why weren't the doctors and lawyers involved
in the studied cases asked what they thought the issues were?
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exchanges in the judicial hearings would have decreased the conflict
and, perhaps, shed additional light.
But the argument is not convincing. Conceptual disagreements
regarding the issues involved appear in a substantial number of the
cases that are analyzed in the article. In addition, where the differences between the lawyers and the doctors can clearly be labeled as
semantical or definitional, we are not shown the possibilities of a different disposition of the case if those differences had been nonexistent.
Case 51' is an excellent example of a conceptual difference (in
that case, between the judge and the doctor) which may more fully
reveal the source of disagreement between the legal and medical professions. In their discussion of that case, the authors expose the problem
of varying threshholds of tolerance. The perception of what constitutes
a significant mental disorder and how much potential danger can be anticipated from that disorder depends largely on the degree of abnormal
behavior which one feels should be tolerated by society. The authors
readily state that the threshhold of tolerance for lawyers is generally
much higher than that for doctors. In Case 14,1" the doctor was insisting on in-patient medical care for the patient's own good while
the lawyer and judge were inclined to allow the patient to seek medical
help voluntarily. It is submitted here that the tolerance threshhold
is a central consideration in the major issues involved in the article,
including "dangerousness," "functioning" and "abnormal behavior."'"
The advocacy role of the lawyer, with his or her legal and civil
libertarian orientation is recognized by the atithors as a major factor
in his or her tolerant stance toward behavior. 2 Lawyers look for
proof, hard evidence and detailed facts. Doctors offer their expert
opinions based on whatever contact they have had with the patient.
9. See pp. 32-34 supra.
10. See pp. 19-23, 29-30 supra.
11. For an excellent examination of societal tolerance and community mental
health, see Shah, Community Mental Health and the Criminal Justice System: Some
Issues and Problems, 54 MENTAL HYGIENE 1 (1970).
Should the hippie be tolerated? The court said yes in In re Sealy, 218 So. 2d
765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
12. The complete study [supra note 4] found some revealing attitudes among
lawyers in the Mental Health Information Service and psychiatrists. Only lawyers
of the MHIS in the First Judicial Department take part and represent the patient in
the hearing procedure. Lawyers in the Second Judicial Department assume a neutral
role, advising patients of their rights and helping patients obtain counsel, but do not
interact with the psychiatrists. First Department lawyers are much more inclined to
view involuntary commitment as dispensable and "dangerousness" as a meaningless
concept or one which can be substantiated only in an historical context. On the other
hand, psychiatrists and Second Department lawyers generally agree that involuntary
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The essence of the hearing is the probable future behavior of the
patient, and on this score, the medical profession has fared poorly."8
Doctors exhibit a pronounced patronizing approach, 1 4 appearing to
believe that civil liberties, while important, must be tailored to the
"best interest" of the patient. They sense a continuing responsibility
for the welfare of the patient as opposed to the lawyer's "one shot"
involvement. That lawyers are also patronizing, albeit to a lesser extent, is revealed in their "silent defense."' 5
The lawyer, as the patient's advocate, acts in furtherance of his
client's expressed interest (that is, to obtain the patient's release), but
doubts whether the patient has the mental capability to express his
"own best interest." When the lawyer's doubts are strong enough,
the "silent defense" or acquiescence results. The question of how much
patronizing is appropriate by both lawyers and doctors in civil commitment hearings is raised but left unanswered.
The underlying assumption of that question is that involuntary
commitment is a valid method of selecting persons for treatment. As
indicated,' this assumption no longer remains unquestioned. For the
legal practitioner who does not make this assumption the course is
clear, and he or she approaches a civil commitment case in the same
fashion as a criminal matter. A practitioner who does not rule out
involuntary commitment as invalid must wrestle with his or her own
position as well as the interests of the client and of the physician. This
7
article provides no guidance in this regard.'
commitment is indispensable and that the concept of dangerousness is a meaningful
diagnosis which depends upon the results of a medical examination.
A personal conversation with Dr. Thomas Szasz revealed that while the movement to abolish involuntary civil commitment (led by the American Association for
the Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization, Inc.) was gaining strength in
his own profession, it is generally lawyers who have been much more willing to add
their support to the effort.
13. Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment,
117 U. PA. L. Rxv. 75 (1968).
14. See Case 31 discussed supra p. 27.
15. See N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88(C), (e) (McKinney 1971). Lawyers in
the Mental Health Information Service perform different functions in the First and
Second Judicial Departments. See note 12 supra. The lawyer-advocates in the First
Department are nevertheless considered neutral and must report information which
may be harmful to the patient's interest. See 1969 Hearings, supra note 2, at 287
(remarks of B. Ennis).
16. Note 12 supra.
17. There is guidance in Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 424 (1966).
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THE LARGER ISSUES IN INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

The need to suggest a normative approach for the lawyer-practitioner is critical. Now that we know that lawyers and doctors frequently differ markedly in their approach, and that the courts tend
to place great weight on expert testimony in civil commitment cases,
how can the patient's interests be best protected? A few suggestions
are in order. Expert witnesses should be limited to dealing with the
question of mental disorder vel non and precluded from drawing conclusions on the issue of dangerousness, where the experts are simply
not expert. The patient should be free, at state expense if necessary,
to hire a doctor of his own choice. Not only would this establish a
sense of fundamental fairness in the use of medical expertise, but
could eliminate somewhat the "silent defense." The adoption of the
"least restrictive alternative" standard first enunciated in Lake v.
Cameron 8 could be significant in fostering community mental health
centers. The state would have the burden of exploring and presenting
acceptable alternatives to absolute commitment.

Finally, more re-

search must be done.
The lack or minimal amount of material on the therapeutic effects
vel non of long-term hospitalization cries out for correction. Similarly,
while charges are made that the process of a hearing is detrimental
to the patient's mental health and future treatment, these have been
refuted by others who feel that the hearing process is, in fact, beneficial therapy for the patient. Neither side has proven its case through
any scientific study. The effect of the availability of independent
medical expertise on behalf of the patient at the hearing requires
exploration.' 9 These issues are currently being litigated' and the
dearth of research is appalling.
18. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
19. The authors state that two independent psychiatrists were employed in connection with the fifty-five cases studied. The number is so small as to be insignificant,
but a larger sample might have provided an interesting comparison in terms of percentage of judicial releases granted in cases which did not have independent medical
expertise present. Further comparisons might be made between MHIS lawyers and
private or legal aid lawyers, and between court trials and jury trials, when the latter
are available.
20. Logan v. Arafeh, Civil No. 14386 (D. Conn., filed May, 1971); Anderson v.

Solomon, 315 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1970); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278
N.E.2d 615 (1972).

